

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

**JONATHAN WILLIAMS,** :  
**Plaintiff,** :  
 :  
v. : : **CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-1137**  
 :  
**RYAN WILLIAMS, et al.** :  
**Defendants.** :

**ORDER**

**AND NOW**, this 11th day of August, 2023, upon consideration of Plaintiff Jonathan Williams's Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* (ECF No. 5), his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 4), and his *pro se* Complaint (ECF No. 1), it is **ORDERED** that:

1. Leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is **GRANTED** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2. Jonathan Williams, #72981-509, shall pay the full filing fee of \$350 in installments, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this case. The Court directs the Warden of the Federal Detention Center Philadelphia or other appropriate official to assess an initial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to Williams's inmate account; or (b) the average monthly balance in Williams's inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this case. The Warden or other appropriate official shall calculate, collect, and forward the initial payment assessed pursuant to this Order to the Court with a reference to the docket number for this case. In each succeeding month when the amount in Williams's inmate trust fund account exceeds \$10.00, the Warden or other appropriate official shall forward payments to the Clerk of Court equaling 20% of the preceding month's income credited to Williams's inmate account until the fees are paid. Each payment shall refer to the docket number for this case.

3. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to send a copy of this Order to the Warden of the Federal Detention Center Philadelphia.

4. The Complaint is **DEEMED** filed.

5. The Complaint is **DISMISSED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE** and **DISMISSED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE** for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum as follows:

a. Claims pertaining to Beyoncé Knowles Carter are **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

b. The claims requesting release from custody and dismissal of the charges against Williams are **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Nothing about this Order precludes Williams from seeking his release or dismissal of the charges in the context of his pending criminal case.

c. Williams's *Bivens* claims based on the conditions of confinement at FDC Philadelphia, lack of access to the courts, and verbal threats and harassment are **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

6. Williams may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order if he is able to cure the defects the Court has identified in his *Bivens* claims. Williams may not attempt to reassert any claim already dismissed with prejudice. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Williams's claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Williams should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the claims

in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so **ORDERED** by the Court.

7. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to send Williams a blank copy of the Court's form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Williams may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.<sup>1</sup>

8. If Williams does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled "Notice to Stand on Complaint," and shall include the civil action number for this case. *See Weber v. McGrogan*, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) ("If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate." (quoting *Borelli v. City of Reading*, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); *In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig.*, 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding "that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims" when the district court "expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims").

9. If Williams fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Williams intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.<sup>2</sup> *See Weber*, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff's intent to stand on his complaint may be

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<sup>1</sup> This form is available on the Court's website at <http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/frmc1983f.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> The six-factor test announced in *Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on his complaint. *See Weber*, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11

inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

**BY THE COURT:**

**/s/ Wendy Beetlestone, J.**

**WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.**

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(treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the *Poulis* factors); *see also Elansari v. Altria*, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (*per curiam*) (directing the district court to “enter an order converting its previous dismissal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice on the merits” when a plaintiff declines to amend, and distinguishing failure to amend from failure to prosecute, which would have required the court to consider the *Poulis* factors before dismissing); *Dickens v. Danberg*, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (*per curiam*) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the *Poulis* factors is not necessary.”); *Baker v. Accts. Receivables Mgmt., Inc.*, 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six *Poulis* factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).